IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
FOR	THE	NORTHERN	DISTRICT	OF	CALIFORNIA

TH THE INTTED STATES DISTRICT CONDT

ROBERT J DENORIS,

Plaintiff,

No C 04-01659 VRW

ORDER

JO ANNE B BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

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Defendant.

DENIES defendant's motion.

Plaintiff Robert J Denoris appeals from the decision of the Social Security Administration (SSA) denying plaintiff social security disability benefits. The court now considers crossmotions for summary judgement. Pl Mot (Doc #13); Def Mot (Doc #14). Because the court concludes that the ALJ's decision was based upon legal error, the court GRANTS plaintiff's motion and

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Α

Plaintiff was fifty-three years old on September 8, 2001, the date he alleges he became disabled. Administrative Record, Doc # 8 (AR) 75. Plaintiff is a high school graduate and has past relevant work experience as a lab technician and driver. AR 76. Plaintiff reports that as a lab technician he used technical skill and knowledge, lifted weights as heavy as twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. Id. Plaintiff has not worked since September 8, 2001. AR 75.

On September 11, 2001, plaintiff underwent open heart bypass surgery and a mitral valve replacement. AR 78, 242. Since the date of his surgery, plaintiff has complained of severe depression, sleep deprivation, fatigue, shortness of breath and dizziness. AR 100. Plaintiff's medical history is primarily reported in the records of his three treating physicians: Dr Kenneth Jiang, MD, Dr Martin Bress, MD, and Dr Niel Starksen, MD. One month after surgery, Dr Steven Schwartz, plaintiff's surgeon, wrote that plaintiff's heart had a regular rate and rhythm and good valve click. AR 242. After examining plaintiff on November 30, 2001, Dr Starksen wrote that the prosthetic mitral valve was functioning normally, and that plaintiff had no further symptoms. AR 346. On August 7, 2002, Dr Starksen recorded that plaintiff's cardiac exam and stress echocardiogram were both normal, and that there was no evidence of ischemia. AR 337. Dr Starksen also noted that plaintiff was "possibly depressed." AR 339. Dr Bress, in a letter to Dr Jiang, stated that on March 26, 2003, plaintiff had completed thirty-six sessions of cardiac rehabilitation, that there

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was no evidence of inducible myocardial ischemia and that plaintiff seemed motivated to make a lifestyle readjustment and planned to join a gym. AR 401.

Five months later, plaintiff's treating internal medicine physician Dr Jiang, in a "cardiac medical source statement questionnaire" dated August 12, 2003, opined that plaintiff was incapable of even low stress jobs, was unable to sit or stand for more than two hours, incapable of lifting more than twenty pounds, and must avoid all exposure to extreme cold, heat, wetness, humidity, noise, fumes, odors and hazards. He noted, moreover, that plaintiff was not a malingerer. AR 495-98.

Plaintiff testified that he saw a psychologist for his depression "for a little while." AR 39. Treating psychologist Dr Wendy Sinclair-Brown, PhD, responded to a medical records request for the period during which she treated plaintiff for depression with the statement that "patient has no psychological problems that prevent him from participating in ADL's or the workforce." AR 369. She provided no other records. Id.

The record also contains reports from consulting examinations ordered by the SSA in connection with plaintiff's claim for benefits. On November 2, 2002, psychiatrist Arthur Floreza, MD, examined plaintiff and diagnosed him with a "depressive disorder not otherwise specified," noting that "[h]e is now currently spending a good deal of time isolating himself from the public and so he would likewise have difficulty maintaining regular attendance in a workplace." AR 363-67. Dr Floreza further noted that plaintiff's depression was likely secondary to his medical condition, and that due to "the chronicity of his medical

For the Northern District of California

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condition [h]is prognosis is quite poor and [] he will [be] unlikely [to] improve within the next 12 months." AR 366. Dr Floreza concluded: "[h]e would be capable of completing simple and repetitive tasks if his medical condition allows * * *[and] the claimant would not have difficulty with complex tasks, again, medical condition permitting." AR 367. On December 19, 2002, psychiatrist Donald Walk, MD, completed a "Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment," indicating that he found plaintiff to be moderately limited in the areas of "the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods" and "the ability to interact appropriately with the general public." AR at 371. Dr Walk concluded that plaintiff has a "depressive feature [that] may reduce public interaction/persistence: [but] he can adapt to competitive employment." AR 372.

В

On June 24, 2002, plaintiff filed an application for social security disability benefits. AR 68. In his initial application, plaintiff stated that he was disabled due to his heart condition; in his reconsideration disability report he stated that his injury had worsened and he was suffering from severe depression, fatigue, sleep deprivation, shortness of breath and dizziness. AR 75, 100. Both initially and on reconsideration, the SSA denied Plaintiff's request for benefits finding that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of Title Two of the Social Security Act (Act). AR 55, 60.

Plaintiff filed a timely request for an administrative
hearing, which took place on August 28, 2003. At the hearing,
plaintiff testified that he was unable to work due to depression
and extreme fatigue resulting from his heart condition. AR at 37,
39. The vocational expert (VE) testified that a hypothetical
fifty-five-year-old individual with plaintiff's past relevant work
experience, level of education, and a residual functional capacity
(RFC) for light work would be able to work as a lab technician. AR
43. The VE also testified that if an individual was limited in the
manner described by Dr Jiang (unable to sit or stand for more than
four hours in a day or to be exposed to extreme environmental
conditions and needing to miss work more than four times a month)
that individual would not be able to work in any job which exists
in substantial numbers in the economy on a full-time basis. AR 48.

On October 21, 2003, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits based on the evidence presented at the hearing, including the testimony of plaintiff and the VE, the reports of Drs Starksen, Jiang, Bress, and Schwartz and other medical records. AR 14-20. The ALJ's decision set forth the five-step sequential evaluation of disability required by 20 CFR § 404.1520, which considered the following: 1) whether plaintiff was currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; 2) whether plaintiff had a severe impairment or combination of impairments; 3) if plaintiff had a severe impairment, whether plaintiff had a condition that met or equaled the conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments, 20 CFR § 404, Pt 404, Subpt P, App 1; 4) if plaintiff did not have such a condition, whether plaintiff was capable of performing his

For the Northern District of California

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past work; and 5) if not, whether plaintiff had the RFC to do other available work.

Applying this five-step sequential evaluation to plaintiff, the ALJ found that: 1) plaintiff met the Act's insured status requirements through December 2006 and had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period; 2) plaintiff had a history of coronary artery disease, status post mitral valve replacement and double bypass, and mild depression; 3) plaintiff did not have an impairment that met or equaled any listed impairment; 4) "the claimant's subjective complaints of shortness of breath, frequent fatigue, reduced stamina and stress were uncorroborated by objective clinical signs and findings showing the existence of medically determinable impairments that could reasonably cause the degree of incapacity alleged"; 5) the conclusions of the functional assessment form submitted by Dr Jiang were not supported by the clinical signs and findings and were contrary to the doctor's progress notes - "[f]or example, Dr Jiang provided no explanation why an individual who was ready to join a gym in March 2002 was incapable of more than very restricted activities in August 2002"; 6) plaintiff retained the RFC for an essentially full range of light work; 7) plaintiff's past relevant work as a lab technician was skilled light work and his past relevant work as a truck/van driver was medium semi-skilled work; 8) plaintiff retained the RFC for his previous employment as a lab technician and also had the capacity to perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy; 9) the claimant had not been under a disability as defined by the Act at any time through the date of the decision. AR 16, 19.

For the Northern District of California

The ALJ also reasoned that the fact that plaintiff had undergone surgery and was taking medication "does not render him disabled," and commented that "given the nature of the surgery his functional nature may have improved." AR 17. Further, the ALJ found that plaintiff's depressive disorder was not severe, reasoning that "[t]he claimant's minimal treatment does not support the presence of a severe mental impairment." Id. concluded that plaintiff was not disabled because he was capable of performing his former light work as a lab technician, or, alternatively, was able to perform other jobs per the VE's testimony. Id.

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision to the SSA's Appeals Council, which denied review. On April 28, 2004, plaintiff timely filed the instant action for judicial review of the ALJ's decision.

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The court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the administrative record to determine whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the SSA complied with the requirements of the Constitution, the Act and its administrative regulations in reaching the decision reviewed. 42 USC § 405(g). A district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if the decision is not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error. See Andrews v Shalala, 53 F3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir 1995); Magallanes v Bowen, 881 F2d 747, 750 (9th Cir 1989). "Substantial evidence" is defined as "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Andrews, 53 F3d at 1039.

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III

Α

The Act provides that certain individuals who are "under a disability" shall receive disability benefits. 42 USC § 423(a)(1)(D). Disability is the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 USC § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual will be found disabled if his impairments are such "that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy * * *." 42 USC § 423(d)(2)(A).

To evaluate a claim of disability based on mental impairment, the ALJ is required to employ a "special technique" at the administrative hearing level to assist in 1) identifying the need for additional evidence, 2) considering and evaluating the functional consequences of the mental disorder on the claimant's ability to work and 3) organizing and presenting the facts. See 20 CFR § 404.1520a(b). The regulation provides:

(b)(1) Under the special technique, we must first evaluate your pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to determine whether you have a medically determinable mental impairment(s). [] If we determine that you have a medically determinable mental

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impairment(s), we must specify the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings that substantiate the presence of the impairment(s) and document our findings in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. * * *

- (c)(1) * * * We will consider all relevant and available clinical signs and laboratory findings, the effects of your symptoms, and how your functioning may be affected by factors including, but not limited to, chronic mental disorders, structured settings, medication, and other treatment. * * * (3) identified four broad functional areas in which we will rate the degree of your functional limitation: Activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of (4)When we rate the degree of decompensation. [] limitation in the first of three functional areas [] we will use the following five-point scale: None, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. When we rate the degree of limitation in the fourth functional area (episodes of decompensation) we will use the following four-point scale: None, one or two, three, four or The last point on each scale represents a degree of limitation that is incompatible with the ability to do any gainful activity.
- (d) * * * After we rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from your impairment(s), we will determine the severity of your mental impairment(s).
- Documenting application of the (e) * * * At the administrative law judge technique. hearing and Appeals Council levels[], we will document application of the technique in the decision. * (2) At the administrative law judge hearing and Appeals Council levels, the written decision issued by the administrative law judge or Appeals Council must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the technique. The decision must show the significant history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section.
- 20 CFR § 404.1520a (emphasis added).
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В

Plaintiff makes two major contentions in support of his motion. First, he contends that the ALJ erred by applying the wrong legal standard when determining whether plaintiff has a mental impairment; specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not follow § 1520a's requirement that she enumerate her findings as to the degree of limitation in each of the four functional areas. Pl Mot (Doc #13 at 4-5). Second, plaintiff contends that the ALJ further erred by failing to incorporate all of plaintiff's alleged impairments into the questions the ALJ posed to the VE. Id. The court agrees with these contentions and finds on that basis that remand to the agency is warranted.

Here, the ALJ did not, at any point in her decision, "include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the four functional areas," nor did the ALJ "incorporate pertinent findings and conclusions" regarding plaintiff's alleged mental impairment as required by § 1520a. Failure to do so requires this court to remand if the plaintiff has a "colorable claim of mental impairment." See <u>Guiterrez v Apfel</u>, 199 F3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir 2000). <u>Guiterrez</u> construed an earlier version of § 1520a which required the ALJ to complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF). An amended section 404.1520a became effective on September 20, 2000, and was therefore applicable to the ALJ's decision in this matter. 65 Fed Reg 507746-01. Prior to its amendment, the regulation merely required the ALJ to complete a PRTF in order to comply with the statute. <u>Guiterrez</u>, 199 F3d at 1049-1050. The new

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regulation abolished the use of the PRTF in favor of requiring the ALJ to set forth detailed findings and conclusions into his or her decision. See 20 CFR § 404.1520a(e)(2), quoted in part III A above.

A plaintiff's claim of mental impairment is "colorable" if it is one which is not "wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous." McBride Cotton & Cattle Corp v Veneman, 290 F3d 973, 981 (9th Cir 2002) (quoting Cassim v Bowen, 824 F2d 791, 795 (9th Cir 1987)). Dr Floreza, a consulting physician, concluded that plaintiff had a depressive disorder; Dr Starksen, one of plaintiff's treating physicians, noted that plaintiff might suffer from depression; and Dr Jiang, another treating physician, concluded that plaintiff's physical symptoms and limitations caused depression. AR at 339, 396, 495. This evidence gives rise to a colorable claim of mental impairment. Accordingly, the ALJ was required to follow the procedures set forth in § 1520a.

The ALJ's noncompliance with § 1520a was not harmless because it resulted in her failure adequately to consider plaintiff's alleged mental impairment as a possible basis for his claim of disability. Specifically, the ALJ did not consider whether, based on plaintiff's degree of limitation in each of the four functional areas, plaintiff's mental impairment was severe at step two, met or equaled a listed impairment at step three, impacted his RFC at step four, or should have been included in her hypothetical questions to the VE at step five. See 20 CFR § 404.1520.

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The ALJ's failure to apply the special technique for mental impairments at 20 CFR § 404.1520a makes it impossible for the court to determine whether substantial evidence supported plaintiff's alleged mental impairment and whether the ALJ thus erred in failing to include this alleged impairment in the hypothetical questions posed to the VE. "An ALJ must propound a hypothetical to a VE that is based on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record that reflects all the claimant's limitations." Osenbrock v Apfel, 240 F3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir 2001)(citing Roberts v Shalala, 66 F3d 179, 184 (9th Cir 1985)).

On remand, the ALJ must evaluate plaintiff's mental impairment using the procedure set out at § 1520a and must then repeat the remaining steps of the sequential evaluation in light of the properly-conducted mental impairment evaluation. If the ALJ determines that under the § 1520a analysis there is substantial evidence of a mental impairment the ALJ must propound hypothetical questions to the VE that reflect this limitation. If the evidence in the record is insufficient to determine the extent of plaintiff's mental impairment under § 1520a, a new psychiatric evaluation may be required. See 20 CFR §§ 404.1519(a)(b)(4), 416.919a(b)(4); see also Smolen v Charter, 80 F3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir 1996) (holding that "[i]n Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the record and to assure that the claimant's interests are considered").

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ΙV

For the reasons stated herein, this matter is remanded to the SSA for re-evaluation of the evidence consistent with this order. The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the file and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge